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Introduction
On September 27, 2011, Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution was amended 
for the purpose of introducing deficit and debt rules. The reform, announced just 
a month earlier by then Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, was ad­
opted following a special procedure established in Article 167 of the Spanish 
Constitution,1 and was a speedy reaction to the unsustainably high cost of Span­
ish bond yields, which had climbed to a 7% interest rate during August 2011.2 
This constitutional reform was primarily intended to ‘appease’ financial markets 
and instill credibility in the Spanish economic system.
The new Article 135 refers to a future ‘organic law’3 to fully implement the new 
measures. On 27 April 2012, Organic Law 2/2012, (Law on Budgetary Stability 
and Financial Sustainability) was approved to this end. 
* Law Counsel (Letrada) at the Spanish Constitutional Court. Associate Professor (Profesora
Titular) of Tax and Finance Law at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. This article was adapted 
from an article which appears in the Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht [Dutch Constitutional Law 
Review] (2013) p. 68. Professors Alain Cuenca and François Vaillancourt thoroughly read this 
manuscript and made useful suggestions that have considerably improved the original version. An 
anonymous reviewer also contributed to improve it. I would also like to thank Professor Jan­Herman 
Reestman for his patience in revising the paper, and Julie Nauman, who edited the final version.
1 Section 167 states that bills on constitutional amendments must be approved by a majority of 
three­fifths of members of each house.
2 See for example ‘Spain’s Economy. Split Personality’, The Economist (7 July 2011), <www.
economist.com/node/18929032?zid=295&ah=0bca374e65f2354d553956ea65f756e0>, visited 7 
July 2011.
3 Organic laws are laws approved by an absolute majority of parliament (Art. 81 Spanish Con­
stitution) and are thus harder to amend (that is, 176 deputies out of a total of 350 must vote in 
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The constitutional reform builds on an existing ‘internal stability pact’ legal 
framework, a set of laws approved in 2001 and reformed in 2006.4 This set of laws 
had the primary objective of coordinating the deficit in what in practice is a 
highly decentralized country, since the Spanish regions, known as ‘autonomous 
communities’, currently manage 35% of public spending, while local entities are 
in charge of 13%. For this reason alone, an internal system to ensure that deficit 
and debt limits were controlled and coordinated was considered of paramount 
importance. The 2001 laws had been contested on the grounds that they limited 
the political autonomy of the Spanish regions. It was partly to address these com­
plaints that the laws were amended in 2006.
As I write these lines, Spain’s banks have already been ‘bailed out’,5 and a full­
fledged bail out is not entirely out of the question for the Spanish economy.6 
Furthermore, measures undertaken to curb the deficit may also be exacerbating 
the economic downturn, as tax revenues plummet and bank deposits leave Span­
ish banks, all making it increasingly harder to meet the debt and deficit targets.7 
During 2012, the Spanish government approved a group of austerity measures to 
lower the debt and deficit.8 In this context, and with economic indicators and 
debt and deficit projections changing almost weekly,9 it is probably too early to 
fully assess the recent constitutional reform enshrining the debt and deficit limita­
tions and the legal framework following it.
favour). Also, only the national parliament, (i.e., not the autonomous communities’ parliaments) 
may pass such laws, which means that such laws are always the purview of the central state.
4 The first Budgetary Stability Law was the ‘Ley 18/2001, de 12 de diciembre, General de Estabi-
lidad Presupuestaria’, modified in 2006 by the ‘Ley 15/2006, de 26 de mayo’. 
5 On 25 June 2012, the Spanish government formally requested ‘external financial assistance’ 
from the EU in the context of the ongoing restructuring and recapitalization of the Spanish bank­
ing sector. This was granted and approved on July 20, 2012. The ‘Memorandum of Understanding 
on Financial­Sector Policy Conditionality’ (MoU, hereinafter) signed earlier on July 10, details 
some of the measures to be approved by Spain in order to receive the financial assistance.
6 The Financial Times editorial of August 28, 2012 (titled ‘For the Good of Spain, Not the 
Party’,) urged the Spanish government to request the bail out immediately. The Economist of Sept. 
14, 2012, points in the same direction (‘More Pain in Spain’).
7 In the press articles abound making this point; just to name two examples, see for instance: 
J. Surowiecki, ‘Smash the Ceiling’, The New Yorker, August 1, 2011, p. 23; Specifically for Spain, see 
W. Münchau, ‘Spain Has Accepted Mission Impossible’, Financial Times, 15 April 2012.
8 Among the strictest, the measures approved on 13 July 2012 included controversial measures 
such as a significant increase in tax pressure (the personal income tax and the value added tax) and 
the reduction of the public servant’s pay by about 7.5%. See a summary of these measures at: <www.
thespanisheconomy.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/en­gb/Public%20Finances%20and%20Pub­
lic%20Debt/Public%20Finances/120713%20Additional%20Fiscal%20Measures.pdf>, visited 13 
May 2013).
9 Official economic indicators are now regularly updated and made available in English at 
<www.thespanisheconomy.com>. 
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One fundamental question is whether the existing legal framework failed, and 
if so, whether the new one can be expected to be more successful. The debt and 
deficit exploded in Spain as a consequence of the 2007 crisis, leading to the first 
‘excessive deficit procedure’ against Spain in 2009.10 Experts agree that it was not 
the lack of a credible legal framework that caused or failed to correct the increase 
of the debt and deficit, but rather the economic crisis, which in Spain followed 
on the heels of the financial crisis. The first direct consequence of the financial 
crisis was the halting of the construction economy, a sector that in 2007 repre­
sented up to 13% of Spain’s gross domestic product (GDP).11 This resulted in 
unemployment rates reaching 27% in 2013, and caused, among other things, the 
plummeting of tax revenues in comparison to the ‘boom years’ of 2005­2007. 
Quite obviously, the legal framework or ‘internal stability pact’ in place before 
the crisis did not prevent the breach of the deficit threshold in 2009, when the 
deficit amounted to 11.2% of the GDP. But it is unlikely that any legal framework 
would have been able to maintain a low deficit during a recession that proved 
much deeper than forecasted.
The purpose of this paper is to briefly explain the current Spanish legal frame­
work to curb the debt and deficit introduced after the constitutional reform of 
September 2011, before the ‘Six Pack’12 and the ‘Fiscal Compact’ (Treaty on Sta­
bility, Coordination and Governance or TSCG)13 were approved, and in so doing, 
to address two questions: to what extent has the reform changed the previous 
10 The first Commission report was published on 18 Feb. 2009. See the full procedure at http://
ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/deficit/countries/spain_en.htm>. 
11 Low interest rates following the euro and the expansion of savings banks (‘Cajas de Ahorros’), 
smaller regional banks that were not sufficiently supervised, substantially contributed to a con­
struction boom that turned into a ‘bubble’, which in Spain was abruptly pierced when borrowing 
became more difficult after the fall of Lehman Brothers, in 2008. There is a significant amount of 
literature on the excessive weight of construction and real estate; see the IMF Country Report No. 
11/216, ‘Spain: Selected Issues’, <www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11216.pdf>, visited 13 
May 2013, p. 6­10. For a summary of the unfolding of the Spanish crisis, see J. Juan et al., Nada 
es Gratis [Nothing is free], Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada (FEDEA) (Ediciones 
Destino, 2011).
12 The ‘Six Pack’ is the set of five regulations and one directive that modify the legal framework 
of the Stability and Growth Pack. See the short guide published by the Commission, which partly 
helps to navigate through what has become a labyrinth of legal rules: ‘Six­pack? Two­pack? Fiscal 
Compact? A Short Guide to the New EU Fiscal Governance’, <http://ec.europa.eu/economy_fi 
nance/articles/governance/2012­03­14_six_pack_en.htm>, visited 25 May 2013. 
13 On the Six Pack, the Two Pack and the Fiscal Compact, see K. Tuori, ‘The European Finan­
cial Crisis –Constitutional Aspects and Implications’, EUI Working Papers, Law 2012/28, p. 1, at 
p. 17. On the financial assistance mechanisms: A. de Gregorio Merino, ‘Legal Developments in the 
Economic and Monetary Union during the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance’, 
Common Market Law Review (2012), p. 1613, at p. 1615. 
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Spanish legal environment of debt and deficit limitation and what consequences 
will it have on the Spanish ‘quasi­federal’ model of autonomous communities.
The new legal framework for curbing the public debt and the 
deficit
The (new) Article 135 of the Constitution was approved well before the signing 
and ratification of the Fiscal Compact, whose Article 3(2) establishes that the 
contracting States shall approve ‘provisions of binding force and permanent char­
acter, preferably constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and 
adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes.’ The Organic Law 2/2012, 
approved after the Fiscal Compact, closely follows its provisions (in particular 
Article 3(1), but it also builds on the previous Spanish legal framework to curb 
excessive debt and deficit. 
In 2001, the ‘internal stability pact’ set strict deficit limitations for budgetary 
policy. In practice, the 2001 laws radically changed how the central government’s 
budget was designed and applied, and as a result, the question of indebtment 
slowly began to creep into the financial agreements with the autonomous com­
munities. But the question of curbing the deficit was not the main purpose of 
these financial agreements, which determine how communities are financed.14 It 
can in fact be argued that the 2001 internal stability pact did not provide sufficient 
incentives to strictly enforce the rules, which to some extent had no teeth, so that 
no real sanctions were imposed upon autonomous communities that failed to meet 
the deficit targets.15 Also, the rules only addressed the deficit, not the debt, so that 
communities were also able to increase their debt burden with relative freedom. 
Despite the obvious shortcomings of the existing legal regime, in the period 1997­
2007 deficit and indebtment were low and there was not much debate, in politi­
cal or academic circles, on the subject. This was probably also due to the 
relatively good shape of Spain’s finances in that period. In fact, the only ongoing 
debate concerned the question of whether the central government had the author­
ity to impose debt and deficit limits on autonomous communities and local enti­
ties (see infra). It is not an overstatement to say that until 2010, there were barely 
even academic seminars on the subject of the internal stability pact and discussions 
on the financing system of autonomous communities typically ignored the debt 
14 The financing of autonomous communities is established in a central government law, cur­
rently Law 22/2009, Dec. 18th. The law follows the agreement between the centre and the com­
munities, but it could eventually be approved without such agreement, as it is not mandatory from 
a constitutional perspective.
15 In fact, some communities lowered their tax pressure as they were building larger deficits; 
see V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘Sharing Taxes and Sharing the Deficit in Spanish Fiscal Federalism’, 10(1) 
eJournal of Tax Research, (Australia) (at ssrn.com), p. 88, at p. 95­97.
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and deficit figures. In this context, the hasty approval of Article 135 of the Span­
ish Constitution was not subject to much previous debate either.16 
The laws regulating the ‘internal pact’ were highly contested from the perspec­
tive of the financial autonomy of autonomous communities, and were challenged 
before the Constitutional Court on the grounds that they reduced the equal dis­
tribution of public funds and curbed the financial autonomy of the autonomous 
communities. The Court addressed these issues in its Opinion of 20 July (STC 
134/2011), upholding the constitutionality of the laws. The constitutional reform 
took place only two months after that opinion.17 
Article 135 reads as follows:18
1. All public administrations will conform to the principle of budgetary stability.
2. The State and the Self­governing Communities may not incur a structural deficit
that exceeds the limits established by the European Union for their member states.
An Organic Act shall determine the maximum structural deficit the state and the 
Self­governing Communities may have, in relation to its gross domestic product. 
Local authorities must submit a balanced budget.
3. The State and the Self­governing Communities must be authorized by Act in
order to issue public debt bonds or to contract loans. 
Loans to meet payment on the interest and capital of the State’s Public Debt shall 
always be deemed to be included in budget expenditure and their payment shall have 
absolute priority. These appropriations may not be subject to amendment or modi­
fication as long as they conform to the terms of issue.
The volume of public debt of all the public administrations in relation to the State’ 
gross domestic product may not exceed the benchmark laid down by the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union.
16 To be sure, a number of legal papers have been published after the Constitutional reform as 
a simple ‘google scholar’ search will show. However, before the constitutional reform, and despite 
the fact that several constitutional complaints had been filed, the issue did not spark much interest 
in the press or academia, (among the exceptions, see the author, in works quoted above and works 
quoted therein; in particular, see J.M. González­Páramo: ‘El Estado y las Haciendas territoriales 
frente a los retos de la estabilidad presupuestaria’ [The State and the Autonomous Communities 
Face the Challenge of Budgetary Stability], 66 Revista de Estudios Regionales (2003), p. 19, at p. 
27; by the same author: Costes y beneficios de la disciplina fiscal: la Ley de estabilidad presupuestaria 
en perspectiva [Costs and Benefits of Budgetary Stability in Spain] (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales 2001); R. Fernández Llera and C. Monasterio Escudero: ‘¿Entre dos o entre todos? Examen 
y propuestas para la coordinación presupuestaria en España’ [Proposals for Budgetary Coordination 
in Spain], 195(4) Hacienda Pública Española (2010) p. 139 at p. 142.
17 After the enactment of new Art. 135, the Constitutional Court has issued ten opinions, all 
ruling on the 2001 laws, but applying the new provision to the reasoning (Opinion 157/2011, 
18 Oct. and Opinions 187, 188 and 189, 23 Nov., 195, 196, 197, 198 and 199, 13 Dec., and 
203/2011, 14 Dec.).
18 Official translation (see <www.congreso.es/consti/constitucion/indice/index.htm>, for a choice 
of the Spanish Constitution in different languages).
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4. The limits of the structural deficit and public debt volume may be exceeded only
in case of natural disasters, economic recession or extraordinary emergency situations 
that are beyond the control of the State and significantly impair either the financial 
situation or the economic or social sustainability of the State, as determined by an 
absolute majority of the members of the Congress of Deputies.
5. An Organic Act shall develop the principles referred to in this article, as well as
participation in the respective procedures of the organs of institutional coordination 
between government fiscal policy and financial support. In any case, the Organic 
Act shall address:
a) The distribution of the limits of deficit and debt among the different public ad­
ministrations, the exceptional circumstances to overcome them and the manner and 
time in which to correct the deviations of each other.
b) The methodology and procedure for calculating the structural deficit.
c) The responsibility of each public administration in case of breach of budgetary
stability objectives.
6. The Self­governing Communities, in accordance with their respective laws and
within the limits referred to in this article, shall take the appropriate procedures for 
effective implementation of the principle of stability in their rules and budgetary 
decisions. 
Section 1 and 2 enshrine the principle of stability for ‘all public administrations’ 
as regulated in secondary EU law, to which section 2 refers. The inclusion of the 
principle of stability is not a radical change or innovation of the Spanish legal 
system, at least to the extent that it was already mentioned in the previous laws 
(the internal stability pact) as well as in secondary EU law, which is part of Span­
ish law. But its inclusion in the Constitution facilitates the coordination between 
Spanish and European budgetary principles, and it also makes it easier to impose 
these limits to sub­national entities without the constant claim that it may limit 
their financial autonomy (enshrined in Article 156 of the Constitution).19
The reform also limits the public debt (section 3), not just the deficit. This is 
new as the internal stability pact only dealt with deficit limits. 
The reform includes several elements of flexibility. A first element is that the 
specific deficit limitations are to be established in an organic law, which is easier 
to change than the Constitution (section 2). An organic law must also develop the 
other principles contained in the Article as well as establish how the autonomous 
communities and the municipalities participate in the process of distributing the 
deficit and debt threshold among the different entities. A second element of flex­
ibility is that the deficit and debt limits may be transgressed in cases of ‘natural 
catastrophes, economic recession or situations of extraordinary emergency that are 
19 From a strict legal perspective, the constitutional reform was not necessary (as there already 
was an internal pact in place), but it was unquestionably a very strong political instrument for 
putting budgetary policy at the forefront of the political agenda. 
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beyond the central Governments control.’ Such circumstances must be assessed 
by an absolute majority of congress (176 out of 350 deputies).
Section 5 refers the fundamental aspects of coordinating budgetary stability to 
an organic law (currently, the above­mentioned Law 2/2012). The Constitution 
mandates this law to develop the principle of stability as well as to establish how 
the autonomous communities and the municipalities will participate in the process 
of distributing the deficit and debt threshold among the different entities. The law 
will then establish how the ‘pie’ of total deficit and debt is distributed among 
subnational entities, as well as the possible sanctions to be applied to those entities 
that do not comply with the limits. 
Article 135.6 directs autonomous communities to adopt the pertinent legisla­
tion, or modify existing legislation if needed, in order to comply with the consti­
tutional provisions.
All in all, Article 135 closely follows the German reform (Articles 109 and 115 
of the Grundgesetz).20 However, contrary to the German counterpart, Article 135 
refers to an organic law for main elements of the regime, such as the actual debt 
and deficit targets and their distribution between the centre, the autonomous 
communities and the municipalities. Organic Law 2/2012, which entered into 
force in April 2012, essentially mimics the European framework (in particular 
Regulation 1175/2011) (secondary) Union law, the Fiscal Compact and even the 
Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, to the extent that it treats 
the autonomous communities as member states (they may thus be ‘bailed­out’ 
and their budgets are closely monitored by the central government, which in this 
capacity resembles the Commission) and the Spanish Constitutional Court as the 
Court of Justice of the EU. Thus, for example, a bail­out mechanism was imple­
mented in 2012, the ‘Regional Liquidity Fund’ (Fondo de liquidez autonómica), 
but it was conditioned on the communities’ compliance with the budgetary mea­
sures or other economic or budgetary measures undertaken by the Ministry of the 
Treasury.21 In this regard, this Law goes well beyond the previous existing legal 
framework on the control of debt and the deficit. Autonomous communities have 
publicly aired their disagreement with what they regard as a severe limitation of 
20 As pointed out, among many others, by E. Cordero González, ‘La reforma de la constitución 
financiera alemana en particular, el nuevo límite al endeudamiento de la federación y los Länder’ 
[The Reform of the Financial Constitution in Germany], 29 Teoría y Realidad Constitucional (2012) 
p. 289 at p. 325­326. See a recent comparison of the ‘golden rule’ in different EU constitutions
at: F. Fabbrini, ‘The Fiscal Compact, the “Golden Rule” and the Paradox of European Federalism’, 
pending publication and available at SSRN (<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2096227>).
21 The regime is laid out in a Royal Decree (Real Decreto-ley 21/2012, de 13 de julio). See a sum­
mary in English at: <www.thespanisheconomy.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/en­gb/Public%20
Finances%20and%20Public%20Debt/Public%20Finances/120713%20Regional%20Liquid 
ity%20Mechanism.pdf>. 
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their fiscal autonomy. However, so far only the Islas Canarias Community has 
filed a formal complaint before the Constitutional Court.22 At the same time, 
some autonomous communities23 have also begun approving their own laws reg­
ulating the stability obligations. 
The new legislation changed the previous legal framework in several ways. The 
main change is the substantial limitation on the leeway of the autonomous com­
munities to incur indebtment and deficit. After decades of legal reforms increasing 
both the taxing powers and financial autonomy of the communities, this may be 
the beginning of the restructuring of the distribution of fiscal and financial author­
ity between the centre and the communities on a much larger scale. The changes 
the organic law brings can be summarized as follows:
Increased powers of the central government. Organic Law 2/2012 draws its author­
ity directly and solely from Article 135 of the Constitution, not from articles of 
the Constitution [Article 149(1), paras. 11, 13 and 14, and Article 157(3)] which 
had until then been employed to guarantee the central government’s power to curb 
the deficit and the debt.24 Article 10(3) of the Law empowers the central govern­
ment to establish any measure necessary to ensure the full coordination of the 
budgetary policies of the autonomous communities, the municipalities and the 
central government. 
Definition of the public sector. Organic Law (Article 2) stresses the need to include 
public enterprises and agencies in the notion of public administration in order to 
avoid gimmickry fiscal practices. Strictly speaking this is not new, but only a 
clarification of the previous rules. This rule is important because some communi­
ties used to ‘hide’ a part of their debt in other entities (mainly public enterprises).25 
22 Complaint No. 557­2013 was filed before the Court last Jan. 2013 (Recurso de inconstituci-
onalidad n. 557-2013), as published in the Official Gazette, ‘Boletín Oficial del Estado’ of 9 March 
2013. 
23 So far, Catalonia and Aragón have both passed budgetary stability laws (Cataluña: Ley 
6/2012, de 17 de mayo, de estabilidad presupuestaria. Aragón: Ley 5/2012, de 7 de junio, de Esta­
bilidad Presupuestaria de Aragón).
24 Art. 149 lays out the authority of the central government in ample terms, providing a list of 
areas: ‘1. The State shall have exclusive competence over the following matters: 
(...)
11.ª Monetary system: foreign currency, exchange and convertibility; bases for the regulations
concerning credit, banking and insurance.
13.ª Basic rules and coordination of general economic planning.
14.ª General financial affairs and State Debt.’
Art. 157(3) is (one of ) the basis of the central government’s coordination powers on the au­
tonomous communities: ‘the exercise of the financial powers set out in subsection 1 above, rules for 
settling the conflicts which may arise, and possible forms of financial cooperation between the self 
governing Communities and the State may be laid down by an organic act.’
25 V. Ruiz Almendral, Estabilidad Presupuestaria y Gasto Público en España [Budgetary Stability 
and Public Spending in Spain] (Madrid, La Ley 2008), p. 269.
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(More) principles. Articles 3 to 10 enunciate a set of principles (stability, fiscal 
sustainability, multi­annual budget planning, transparency, efficiency, responsibil­
ity, and coordination) that should not only direct all public spending rules or 
regulations of the individual entities concerned, but also the relations among them. 
The stability principle, already present in the previous legal framework, is now 
defined as ‘equilibrium’ (Article 3(2)) or a zero structural deficit.26 
Deficit target. The principle of a zero structural deficit target is enshrined in 
Article 11(2), but the deficit may be increased to a maximum of –0.4% GDP if 
structural reforms with long term effects are undertaken. The wording mimics that 
of the Fiscal Compact (Article 3(3)(b)), but it is in fact stricter (except for the fact 
that it will not enter into force until 2020, as will be explained below).
Control of spending growth and expenditure ceiling. Article 12 rules that the 
growth rate of public spending of all entities (the centre and subnational) may not 
surpass the mid­term GDP growth. Article 30 requires all budgets to define an 
expenditure ceiling which must be met.27
Debt limits. Article 13 establishes debt limitations for the first time in the do­
mestic rules on budgetary stability. But there is a caveat: together with the zero 
deficit target set by Article 11(2), these limitations will not be applicable until 
2020, according to the Organic Law’s first transitory provision. This of course 
means that until then the applicable limits will be those agreed with the EU in­
stitutions (currently within the framework of the Excessive Deficit Procedure) and 
included in the annual stability program (following the European semester).28
The enforcement of the reform and the internal distribution of the deficit and debt 
targets. Chapter IV of the Organic Law sets up a complicated system of sanctions 
directed at the municipalities and the autonomous aommunities. The system 
clearly follows the EU system: there is a ‘prevention’ phase where measures may 
be proposed to subnational entities and a ‘correction’ phase with the possibility of 
monetary sanctions. None of these measures have yet been implemented, although 
at least three communities (Valencia, Catalonia and Castilla­La Mancha), and 
especially the first two, are in breach of the criteria.
The role of the Constitutional Court. The new law enhances the role of the Con­
stitutional Court, which has already played a fundamental role in shaping the 
Spanish State of Autonomies, in particular by interpreting the boundaries of the 
26 The notion of ‘structural deficit’ is not defined, but as can be inferred from the rest of the law, 
it refers to the end result of the economic cycle; that is, the zero deficit limits are not imposed in 
absolute terms.
27 The growth rate limit had already been established in a royal decree (Real Decreto­ley 8/2011, 
de 1 de julio), but it was then only binding for the central government and large local entities (such 
as Madrid, Valencia, Barcelona or Seville).
28 The 2020 deadline has been controversial. It makes sense to the extent that the law sets a zero 
deficit rule, which is probably unsustainable in any scenario. 
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respective level of authorities, which in most cases are shared by the centre and 
the communities. The new organic law (additional provision No. 3) states that 
any provision that contravenes Article 135 of the Constitution may be challenged 
before the Court. This seems unnecessary, since the Constitution already provides 
for this role of the Court (Article 161), unless of course its intention is to reinforce 
the traditional Court’s role as umpire of the system.
A re­centralization of the Spanish ‘state of autonomies’?
Spain may not be a federal country by name, but the level of decentralization of 
public expenditures and, to a lesser extent, of taxation powers, equals that of many 
formal or traditional federations. Unlike the constitutions of other federal states, 
such as Germany, the Spanish Constitution of 1978 does not contain any reference 
to the system of the state. That is, it does not describe the state as either centralised, 
unitary, federal, or regional. After almost forty years of Franco’s highly centralized 
government, consensus on this matter was hard to obtain. Nevertheless, the de­
centralization process in Spain has in financial (see Table 1)29 and fiscal terms been 
a remarkable shift away from centralization. At least until the crisis, this decen­
tralization had been well accepted by citizens.3031
Table 1. Decentralization of public spending in Spain (percentage share of spending)
Administration 1982 1996 2009
Central government 53 37.5 20.9
Social security1 32.5 29.2 29.9
Autonomous communities 3.6 22.3 35.6
Municipalities 10.6 11.6 13.6
Given this multi­level structure, Spain clearly needed to have a credible system to 
both coordinate and limit the debt and deficit of municipalities and autonomous 
29 See a good summary of that process, as well as the current situation of distribution of author­
ity at: C. Colino and E. del Pino, ‘Spanish Federalism in Crisis’, in Paul Peterson and Daniel Nadler 
(eds.), The Global Debt Crisis. Haunting U.S. and European Federalism (Washington, Brookings 
Institution Press 2013 (forthcoming)).
30 In a recent poll conducted by ‘El Pais’, 80% of respondents think the autonomous com­
munities model should be ‘reconsidered’. See also David Gardner. ‘Spain: Autonomy under Fire’, 
Financial Times (August 15, 2012), <www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/00d27e14­e63a­11e1­ac5f­
00144feab49a.html#axzz245UeD4Zh>. 
31 Social security is a central government responsibility, but it has its own budget so it is usually 
disaggregated when presenting the debt and deficit projections.
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communities, an issue that had been almost completely off the political agenda 
until the crisis began,32 despite the stability laws. 
In 2002 the devolution process culminated in the transfer of health and educa­
tion authority – by far the areas of greatest expense – to the autonomous com­
munities.33 But, as has often been argued, the financial systems of autonomous 
communities approved in 2001 and 2009, established in central government law, 
failed to ensure both that communities would spend the necessary resources on 
these areas34 and that they would develop their own taxing policy to obtain further 
revenues.35 This is related to a fundamental structural problem, which is the lack 
of fiscal responsibility demonstrated by autonomous communities. The autonomies 
have generally been reluctant to use their taxing powers to raise revenue, and instead 
relied on government transfers or public debt, thereby avoiding the political cost 
of increasing tax pressure. 
This is an old debate in Spain. In a book published in 1988, Antoni Castells 
had already argued that the level of fiscal responsibility should correspond to the 
level of devolution of authority.36 In 1995, a report by a group of experts (known 
as the ‘White Book’ or ‘Libro Blanco’), proposed different methods to increase the 
taxing powers of autonomous communities, in order to make them more account­
32 In fact, the substantial 2009 reform of the autonomous communities’ financing system fo­
cused more on their new taxing powers, or the extra revenues needed in order to finance health 
and education. It is also telling that the first draft of the Spanish Constitution included a provision 
curbing the autonomies’ access to indebtment, which was discarded in the final version.
33 They amount to about 80% of their public spending, see the estimation by C. Monasterio 
Escudero and J. Suárez Pandiello at Manual de Hacienda autonómica y local [Handbook of Local 
and Regional Finances] (Barcelona, Ariel 1998) p. 59. Although it does vary by autonomous com­
munities, it is still a valid estimation.
34 See data and conclusions at A. Cuenca, ‘Estabilidad Presupuestaria y endeudamiento au­
tonómico en la crisis’ [Budgetary Stability and Regional Indebtment], Cuadernos de Derecho Pú-
blico, May 2012 (the author, Alain Cuenca, directed the high office for the coordination of budget­
ary policies between the centre and subnational entities until 2011 (named Dirección General de 
Coordinación Financiera con las Comunidades Autónomas y con las Entidades Locales), so the article 
contains substantial information on the period 2008­2011). See also by A. Cuenca, ‘Estabilidad pre­
supuestaria y Comunidades Autónomas’, at Estabilidad presupuestaria y Sostenibilidad Financiera. 
(Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales 2013 (forthcoming)).
35 See, among others, the work of A. de la Fuente (in particular: ‘Qué reformas necesita el 
sistema de financiación regional?’ [What Reforms Does the Regional Financing System Need?], 
at Fundación Sepi, May 2012, <www.fundacionsepi.es/ciea/Reforma%20Financiacion%20Auto­
nomica%20(Angel%20de%20la%20Fuente).pdf>, visited14 May 2013); by the same author, see 
‘La evolución de la financiación de las comunidades autónomas de régimen común, 1999­2009’ 
[The Evolution of Regional Financing] (Mimeo) (Instituto de Análisis Económico, CSIC), <http://
ideas.repec.org/p/aub/autbar/889.11.html>. 
36 A. Castells Oliveres, Hacienda Autonómica. Una perspectiva de federalismo fiscal. [Regional 
Finances. A Fiscal Federalism Perspective] (Barcelona, Ariel 1988).
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able for the revenues they obtained.37 The system was substantially transformed 
in 1997, when some taxes formerly managed by the Centre were turned into ‘shared 
taxes’, enabling communities to establish their own rates and deductions for some 
important taxes (such as the personal income tax). This shared taxation scheme 
was modified, and enlarged, in 2001 and 2009. But most communities in fact 
employed their newly enlarged taxing powers to establish tax deductions and thus 
lowered the tax pressure in their territories.38 This lack of fiscal responsibility has 
enhanced what in fiscal federalism literature is known as the ‘vertical fiscal imbal­
ance’, or the situation that arises when one tier of government – usually the central 
state – has a greater power to obtain income than it actually needs for the exercise 
of its authority, while the other – subnational governments – is in the opposite 
situation.39 
This is a problem for debt and deficit because when subnational governments 
receive financing almost exclusively in the form of transfers, an incentive to over­
spend those moneys is created. The idea is simple and similar to the ‘moral hazard’40 
problem: it is easier to spend revenue when, a) one does not withstand the po­
litical burden of having to raise it (i.e., establishing or raising taxes), and b) there 
is no need to explain the relationship between revenue raised and spent to voters/
taxpayers. The situation creates a lack of accountability that fosters the increase of 
debt and deficit.
37 C. Monasterio Escudero et al., Informe sobre el actual sistema de financiación autonómica y sus 
problemas. [Report on the Current System of Regional Finances] (Madrid Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales 1995).
38 See examples and details of the financing systems at: V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘The Asymmetric 
Distribution of Taxation Powers in the Spanish State of Autonomies: The Common System and 
the Foral Tax Regimes’, 13(4) Regional and Federal Studies (2003) (Routledge, Frank Cass Jour­
nal; V. Ruiz Almendral and F. Vaillancourt: ‘Choosing to Be Different (or Not): Personal Income 
Taxes at the Subnational Level in Canada and Spain’, 29 Papel de Trabajo del Instituto de Estudios 
Fiscales (2006), and, most recently: V. Ruiz Almendral, ‘Sharing Taxes and Sharing the Deficit in 
Spanish Fiscal Federalism’, 10(1) eJournal of Tax Research (2012) (Australia), p. 88­125. See also 
the following three articles: J. Martínez­Vázquez, ‘Revenue Assignments in the Practice of Fiscal 
Decentralization’, in N. Bosch and J.M. y Durán (eds.), Fiscal Federalism and Political Decentraliza-
tion. Lessons from Spain, Germany, and Canada (Cheltenham/Northampton, Edward Elgar 2008); 
J. López­Laborda et al., ‘The Practice of Fiscal Federalism in Spain’, in A. Shah (ed.), The Practice 
of Fiscal Federalism: Comparative Perspectives (Quebec, The Forum of Federations McGill­Queen’s 
University Press 2010) p. 287­316; and A. Zabalza and J. López Laborda, ‘The New Spanish System 
of Intergovernmental Transfers’, 18 International Tax and Public Finance (2011) p. 750­786.
39 Also referred to as the problem of ‘fiscal mismatch’, ‘fiscal gap’ or ‘revenue gap’, see: W.E. 
Oates, ‘An Economist’s Perspective on Fiscal Federalism’, in W.E. Oates (ed.), The Political Economy 
of Fiscal Federalism (Toronto, Lexington Books 1977) p. 16.
40 R. Boadway, ‘Recent Developments in the Economics of Federalism’, in H. Lazar (ed.), Can-
ada: The State of The Federation 1999/2000. Toward a New Mission Statement for Canadian Fiscal 
Federalism (Kingston, Institute of Intergovernmental Relations 2000) p. 51. 
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Furthermore, until 2011 the financing system of the autonomous communities 
did not sufficiently take into account the constraints of the EU Stability Pact.41 
Moreover, as stated before, the sanctions in Spain’s internal stability pact were not 
credible enough and communities were in practice able to run large deficits while 
reducing the tax pressure for their citizens.42 
Together with the expenditure ceiling, the possibility of imposing sanctions, 
the reform has substantially altered the previous legal framework. It is too early, 
and the crisis is still too deep, to conclude what effects the new framework will 
have on the deficit and debt limits. But it is already clear that the budgetary pro­
cesses and even the nature of the Spanish fiscal federalism system have been fun­
damentally transformed. 
The new stability rules may facilitate a re­centralization of the powers of the 
autonomous communities. This is in line with the ongoing centralization that the 
Fiscal Compact and more generally the European Union’s economic constitution 
are bringing about.43 These instruments not only entail centralization of powers, 
but also the transformation of the member states’ economic constitutions.44 Also, 
the new internal stability may accelerate the process of re­centralization in which, 
as has already been suggested, Spain was already engaged.45 One example concerns 
the process of distributing and sharing the deficit and debt ‘pie’ among different 
tiers of government. The system of intergovernmental relations between the cen­
tre and the communities which characterized the previous internal stability pact 
has been reshaped: the deficit and debt ‘pie’ is divided by the centre among com­
munities, which have virtually lost all leeway to propose their own debt limits. 
Formal meetings in the ‘Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera’, an intergovern­
mental council where the Minister of the Treasury meets with the corresponding 
officials of the autonomous communities,46 is increasingly just a forum where the 
41 Political agreements between the central government and the communities, which took place 
under the auspices of the Consejo de Política Fiscal y Financiera did address the issue of the com­
munities’ revenues, but omitted all reference to debt and deficit limitations.
42 See Cuenca, supra n. 34, p. 163.
43 See Fabbrini, supra n. 20, p. 24. 
44 See F. Snyder, ‘EMU Revisited: Are We Making a Constitution? What Constitution Are We 
Making?’, in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 1999) p. 418.
45 See R. Máiz and A. Losada, ‘The Erosion of Regional Powers in the Spanish “State of Autono­
mies”’, in F. Requejo and K.J. Nagel (eds.), Federalism beyond Federations (Surrey, Ashgate 2011) 
p. 84 at p. 85­92.
46 The Consejo meets with closed doors and its minutes are not published, although its agree­
ments eventually are (see <www.minhap.gob.es/es­ES/Areas%20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Auto
nomica/Paginas/Consejo%20de%20Politica%20Fiscal%20y%20Financiera.aspx>, visited 30 Aug. 
2012.
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centre tells communities what their deficit/debt targets amount to, and what they 
must do to meet them.47 
Furthermore, communities’ control over their own budgets has substantially 
decreased, in particular because many of them have serious problems just meeting 
current payments, let alone future debt maturing payments. For that reason, sev­
eral bail­out mechanisms have already been established. In 2012, two state­fund­
ed mechanisms to aid ailing communities were put in place: the ‘payments to 
suppliers mechanism’48 and the ‘regional liquidity mechanism’. This last fund, 
which was distributed among those communities that needed it in September 
2012, is currently the subject of much debate. In 2012, the fund amounted to 18 
billion euros.49 In 2013, this fund will reach an amount of 23 billion euros.50 On 
top of this, or precisely because of this region bail­out system, the crisis has fostered 
a revival of the separatist debate. Cataluña, a community with a long tradition of 
nationalist supporters, has recently reopened the debate on the need to reform its 
financing system.51 
47 Communities have already had to undertake substantial measures to reduce spending. See de­
tails at: <www.minhap.gob.es/es­ES/Paginas/20120621_PEF_CCAA.aspx>, visited30 Aug. 2012.
48 Regulated in two royal decrees: Royal Decree Law 4/2012, of 24 Feb., which sets out the 
obligations of information and procedures required for the establishment of a financing mechanism 
for the payment to suppliers of local entities and Royal Decree Law 7/2012, of 9 March, which 
provides for the creation of the fund for the financing of payments to suppliers. 
49 These figures and bail­out announcements have been extracted from the daily news of the 
three main Spanish newspapers (El País, ABC and El Mundo). To date, no official figures have 
been published. In 2012, the following communities benefited from the fund: Valencia, Murcia, 
Cataluña, Andalucía, Castilla­La Mancha, Canarias, Baleares and Principado de Asturias (all this, 
according to press releases. The official website of the Ministry of the Treasury contains no specific 
information on who is a beneficiary of thefFund).
50 The figure is established in the 2013 National Budgetary Law.
51 Catalonia currently has virtually the same level of authority as the rest of the autonomous 
communities, but it has traditionally shown a stronger interest in autonomy and thereby driven 
reform for the rest of communities. It was Catalonia’s Statute in 1979 that set the agenda for a 
major reform in Spain, which was quickly transformed from a central­state model into a substan­
tially decentralised country. It was also the need for the support of Convergencia I Unió (CiU) – the 
centre­right nationalist party – that made the different central governments (the Socialist Party in 
1993 and the People’s Party in 1996 and 2001) agree on a change of the financial system largely 
based on a model proposed by Catalonia. And once again, the 2001 and 2009 reforms of the finan­
cial system were largely driven by Catalonia’s proposals. At the moment, Catalonia’s public debt has 
ballooned to a 21% of GDP (from 7.4% in 2003). Following this data, the economist Xavier Sala i 
Martín, (among many others) has recently proposed full independence as the only way out: see ‘The 
Catalan Bail­Out’, <http://salaimartin.com/randomthoughts/item/405­the­catalan­bailout.html>, 
visited 31 Aug. 2012. 
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Concluding remarks 
The new legal framework has also substantially altered the budgetary process. The 
first batch of stability laws in Spain (2001) had already brought about substantial 
changes in all aspects of the budget. In particular, it had transformed the budget 
procedure as defined in Article 134 of the Constitution. According to this article, 
the old process was purely domestic, starting with the government preparing a 
budget bill, which was then examined by the Parliament, executed by the govern­
ment, controlled by the internal organs of the government (auditors at the Public 
Administration – Intervención General de la Administración del Estado) and, even­
tually, the Court of Auditors (dependent from parliament). Since the reforms, 
there is a phase ‘zero’, whereby the government presents the ‘stability objective’ or 
indicators of deficit and spending, which have been previously been examined by 
the Commission and must be approved by parliament. This objective is then the 
basis for the elaboration of the proposed budget (Article 15.7 of the Organic Law).
A blunt conclusion is that there is no longer a budget controlled by parliament 
and the government alone. The current semi­bail out, or ‘bail­out pending’ situ­
ation, together with the excessive deficit procedure already in place, implies an 
enhanced supervision of the different phases of the budget via the European se­
mester.52
Furthermore, the whole process depends on projections of economic output, 
which are notorious for being volatile and thus unreliable. Already, after the imple­
mentation of the above­mentioned austerity measures, predictions are grimmer 
than the official figures serving to prepare the 2012 and 2013 budget projects.53 
On July 10th, 2012, the Council of the European Union gave Spain an extra year 
to meet the deficit targets, which are now 6.3% GDP for 2012, 4.5% of GDP for 
2013 and 2.8% GDP for 2014. The same document54 shows that the 2009 recom­
mendations assumed growth rates that did not occur (a growth rate of 1% had 
been initially assumed for 2012 and 2013, compared with the –1.9% and –0.3% 
52 As stated in the MoU: ‘there is a close relationship between macroeconomic imbalances, 
public finances and financial sector soundness. Hence, progress made with respect to the imple­
mentation of the commitments under the Excessive Deficit Procedure, and with regard to structural 
reforms, with a view to correcting any macroeconomic imbalances as identified within the frame­
work of the European Semester, will be regularly and closely monitored in parallel with the formal 
review process as envisioned in this MoU’, Point 29 of the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on 
Financial­Sector Policy Conditionality’, July 2012.
53 According to the latest (28 Aug. 2012) report by the National Institute of Statistics (INE), 
private consumption has plummeted following the reduction of salaries (see press release, <www.
ine.es/prensa/cntr0212.pdf>, visited 29 Aug. 2012. See also the grim perspectives published by the 
IMF, at <www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2012/pn1287.htm>, visited 29 Aug. 2012.
54 See press release by the Council of 10 July 2012 (No. 12387/12), at <www.consilium.europa.
eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131676.pdf>, visited 31 Aug. 2012.
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rates currently estimated). According to the 2013­2016 Stability Program, submit­
ted to the Commission on April 26, 2 013,55 real GDP will fall to –1.3% (with 
an estimated growth of 0.5% for 2014, 0.9% for 2015 and 1.3% for 2016). The 
deficit for 2012 was –7.0% GDP, and the projection for 2013 –6.3%.
The weak link of the system, both the Spanish internal stability system and the 
EU rules (Fiscal Compact/Six Pack), is that it is largely based on measuring eco­
nomic output and the attached variables. As the changing data demonstrate,56 the 
economic environment cannot be as predictable as the rule of law would like it to 
be. Designing a macro legal framework that may trigger such harsh consequences 
(such as requiring austerity measures, eventually imposing sanctions, etc.) but that 
is fundamentally based on contingent data, which increasingly also depends on 
volatile markets, is a dangerous situation which should be the subject of a deeper 
debate. Like military drones,57 the budget rules are in peril of becoming something 
akin to ‘armed unmanned budgetary vehicles’, well intended but whose conse­
quences are hard to control or predict, going much beyond what Rawls may have 
anticipated in his famous ‘veil of ignorance’ analogy.58
55 Available in English at <www.thespanisheconomy.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/en­gb/
Economic%20Outlook/Stability%20Programme%202013­2016.pdf>, visited 13 May 2013.
56 See the point made by M. Wolf, ‘Mind the Gap: The Perils of Forecasting Output’, Financial 
Times (8 Dec. 2011, on an article referring to the ‘Office for Budgetary Responsibility’ created in 
the UK.
57 See A. Callam, ‘Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles’, XVIII(3) International 
Affairs Review (2010), <www.iar­gwu.org/node/144#comment­739>, visited 25 Nov. 2011).
58 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 
1971) (rev. edn. 1999) p. 118.
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